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Expansion of the Scope of Disclosure
Required under the Informed Consent
Doctrine: Moore v. The Regents of The
University of California
I. INTRODUCTION
The informed consent doctrine has traditionally required that a
physician disclose to a patient the nature, risks and benefits of a pro-
posed medical procedure.' The California courts2 and legislature3
1. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert.denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972) (holding that a medical practitioner must inform a patient of any information a
reasonable patient would consider material to the decision of whether to undergo the
proposed medical treatment). See generally, Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic
Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 340 (1974); Levine, Informed
Consent in Research and Practice 143 ARCH. INTERN MED. 215 (1983); R. FADEN, T.
BEAUCHAMP & N. KING, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986); Katz,
Informed Consent - A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137 (1977).
2. See, Magan Medical Clinic v. California State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 249
Cal. App. 2d 124, 132, 57 Cal. Rptr. 256, 262 (1967) (recognizing that a patient de-
serves to be free of any suspicion that a physician's judgment has been affected by a
profit motive).
3. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 654.1 stating in its pertinent part:
Persons licensed under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 1600) of this
division or licensed under Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 2000) of this
division or licensed under any initiative act referred to in this division relating
to osteopaths may not refer patients, clients, or customers to any clinical labo-
ratory licensed under Section 1265 in which the licensee has any membership,
proprietary interest, or co-ownership in any form, or has any profit-sharing ar-
rangement, unless the licensee at the time of making such referral discloses in
writing such interest to the patient, client or customer. The written disclosure
shall indicate that the patient may choose any clinical laboratory for purposes
of having any laboratory work or assignment performed.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE, § 654.1 (West 1986).
See also CAL. Bus & PROF. CODE § 654.2 stating in its pertinent part:
a) It is unlawful for any person licensed under this division or under any initia-
tive act referred to in this division to charge, bill, or otherwise solicit payment
from a patient on behalf of, or refer a patient to, an organization in which the
licensee, or the licensee's immediate family, has a significant beneficial interest,
unless the licensee first discloses in writing to the patient, that there is such an
interest and advises the patient that the patient may choose any organization
for the purpose of obtaining the services ordered or requested by the licensee.
b) The disclosure requirements of subdivision (a) may be met by posting a
have also recognized that the scope of disclosure required under the
informed consent doctrine may require the disclosure of additional
information beyond that directly related to the patient's medical
treatment. Indeed, the recent California Supreme Court decision in
Moore v. The Regents of the University of California4 clearly ex-
tends the informed consent doctrine to require the disclosure of eco-
nomic or research interests in the proposed medical procedure.
This Note will review the informed consent doctrine and the scope
of disclosure traditionally required under that doctrine. The in-
formed consent doctrine, as it applies to economic and research in-
terest in a particular medical situation, derives from both case law5
and international, federal, and state statutes.' The scope of disclo-
sure required by the informed consent doctrine under both case law
and statutes will be reviewed.
This Note will then discuss the conflicting loyalties that a physi-
cian having either an economic or research interest in a particular
patient faces when obtaining that patient's informed consent.7 Ulti-
mately, this Note will conclude that, in light of the decision in
Moore v. The Regents of the University of California, any interest
causing the physician to have conflicting loyalties must be disclosed
under the California doctrine of informed consent.8
This Note will not directly address the claims for conversion of
bodily cells presented in Moore because the supreme court denied
the conversion claims." In addition, several commentaries specifically
address the claim for conversion of bodily cells presented in Moore.10
conspicuous sign in an area which is likely to be seen by all patients who use
the facility or by providing those patients with a written disclosure statement.
Where referrals, billings, or other solicitations are between licensees who con-
tract with multispecialty clinics pursuant to subdivision (1) of Section 1206 of
the Health and Safety Code or who conduct their practice as members of the
same professional corporation or partnership, and the services are rendered on
the same physical premises, or under the same professional corporation or part-
nership name, the requirements of subdivision (a) may be met by posting a
conspicuous disclosure statement at a single location Which is a common area
or registration area or by providing those patients with a written disclosure
statement.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE, § 654.2 (West 1986).
4. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d
479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
5. See infra notes 11-21 and the accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 22-41 and the accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 42-52 and the accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 105-26 and the accompanying text.
9. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 121, 793
P.2d 492, 493, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 147 (1990). Typically, the "knowledge of risks in-
volved [and] alternatives . . .", BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 701 (5th ed, 1979).
10. See, e.g., Howard, Biotechnology Patients' Rights and the Moore Case, 44
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 331 (1989) (addressing the property issues raised by the Court
of Appeal decision in the Moore Case.); Danforth, Cells, Sales, and Royalties: The Pa-
tient's Right to a Portion of the Profits, 6 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 179 (1988) (arguing
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II. SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA INFORMED CONSENT LAW
In California, the informed consent doctrine requiring a physician
to obtain a patient's informed consent to a particular medical proce-
dure or face liability for malpractice was articulated in Salgo v. Le-
land Stanford, Jr. University Board of Trustees." The court re-
quired the physician to disclose all the facts necessary for patients to
give their informed consent to the procedure. 2 This decision, to-
gether with the requirement that a patient's informed consent be ob-
tained before proceeding with a medical procedure, placed a signifi-
cant duty of disclosure upon the physician.
The rationale behind placing a duty of disclosure on a physician
was further articulated by the California Supreme Court in Cobbs v.
Grant:'3
Preliminarily we employ several postulates. The first is that patients are
generally persons unlearned in the medical sciences and therefore, except in
rare cases, courts may safely assume the knowledge of patient and physi-
cian are not in parity. The second is that a person of adult years and in
sound mind has the right, in the exercise of control over his own body, to
determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical treatment. The third
is that the patient's consent to treatment, to be effective, must be an in-
formed consent. And the fourth is that the patient, being unlearned in med-
ical sciences, has an abject dependence upon and trust in his physician for
the information upon which he relies during the decisional process, thus
raising an obligation in the physician that transcends arms-length
transactions."'
The court in Cobbs v. Grant also stated that the listed rationale
produced a requirement "for divulgence by the physician to his pa-
tient of all information relevant to a meaningful decisional pro-
cess."' 5 In addition, the court considered this duty of disclosure to be
"an integral part of the physician's overall obligation to the patient.
"18
The scope of the physician's disclosure to the patient "must be
measured by the patient's need, and that need is whatever informa-
tion is material to the decision. 1'7 The extent of what information
that patients should share in profits made from their tissue based on a property right in
the body); Note, Toward the Right of Commerciality; Recognizing Property Rights in
the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207 (1986) (arguing for a
limited property right in the commercial value of the body).
11. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
12. Id. at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
13. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
14. Id. at 242, 502 P.2d at 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
17. Id. at 245, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515 (emphasis added). See also
might be material to the patient's decision has been addressed by the
court. In Truman v. Thomas, the court defined material information
as "that which the physician knows or should know would be re-
garded as significant by a reasonable person in the patient's position
when deciding to accept or reject the recommended medical
procedure."' 18
The California courts and the legislature have determined the type
and extent of the information that must be disclosed to the patients
regarding their treatment. Some courts have used the terms "full
and complete"'19 disclosure and have stated that any "material con-
cealment or misrepresentation will amount to fraud .... ,,2o The
courts have recognized that in addition to disclosing the nature, risks
of, and alternatives to the proposed treatment, additional informa-
tion not directly related to the patient's treatment may have to be
disclosed.2
In Magan Medical Clinic v. California State Board of Medical
Examiners,22 the court specifically recognized that if a physician
stood to profit from the sale of the therapeutic drugs to the patient,
this fact must be disclosed to the patient.2 3 The court further stated
that the disclosure of this sort of information was required because
"[c]ertainly a sick patient deserves to be free of any reasonable sus-
picion that his doctor's judgment is influenced by a profit motive. "24
The court recognized that failure to disclose such potential profits
would be a violation of section 654.2 of the California Business and
Profession Code and thus thwart the legislature's intentions. 2
The California courts and legislature have clearly contemplated
that a physician must disclose any direct or indirect interests in
pharmacies, drug manufacturers, medical supply companies, medical
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)
(holding that a medical practitioner must inform a patient of any information a reasona-
ble patient would consider material to the decision of whether to undergo the proposed
medical treatment).
18. Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 291, 611 P.2d 902, 905, 165 Cal. Rptr.
308, 311.
19. Bowman v. McPheeters, 77 Cal. App. 2d 795, 801, 176 P. 2d 745, 748 (1947).
20. Id.
21. Magan Medical Clinic v. Cal. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 249 Cal. App.
2d 124, 57 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1967).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 132, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
24. Id.
25. CAL. Bus & PROF. CODE § 654.2 (West 1986) (The relevant part of § 654.2 is
given in note 3). Profits would be a substantial beneficial interest under California Busi-
ness and Professions Code section 654.2. The term "organization", as used in section
654.2 "refers to any entity that provides services or supplies for a practitioner-patient
relationship," 68 Op. Cal. Att'y. Gen. 140, 140 (1985); A substantial beneficial interest
under section 654.2 includes various "indirect interests such as stock ownership and in-
terests in parent companies which wholly own the affected organization," 68 Op. Cal.
Att'y. Gen. 140, 140 (1985).
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diagnostic laboratories, and dispensing optical businesses.2" The test
for whether a physician's relationship with a particular entity must
be disclosed appears to be whether that entity or organization pro-
vides services or supplies for the physician-patient relationship.
The requirement that information material to the patient's deci-
sion must be disclosed is sufficiently broad to encompass a physi-
cian's research interest in a patient.28 The Nazi atrocities carried out
under the pretext of scientific research2" together with several re-
ports of research subject abuse in the United States30 have led to
both international, federal and state regulations governing human
experimentation.
All of the above regulatory systems rely on informed consent as
one of the principal methods to prevent the abuse of human research
subjects. For example, the judgment of the Nuremburg Military Tri-
bunal included the Nuremburg Code which indicated that voluntary
consent was an essential component of preventing human subject
abuse while conducting human experimentation. 1 The scope of the
disclosure to the research subject was stated in general terms and
included disclosure of "the nature, duration, and purpose of the ex-
26. See supra notes 2-3 and the accompanying text.
27. See supra note 23.
28. See Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treat-
ment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 353 (1974).
29. The atrocities included high-altitude, malaria and sterilization experiments.
For a chilling description of the exact atrocities, see J. AREEN P. KING, S. GOLDBERG &
A. CAPRON, LAW, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 907-24 (1984) [hereinafter J. AREEN, LAW,
SCIENCE AND MEDICINE].
30. See, e.g., Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW. ENGL. J. MED.
1354 (1966) (describing hundreds of abuses of informed consent). See also, Brandt, Ra-
cism and Research: The case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 8 HASTINGS CENT. REP.
21 (Dec. 1978) (describing the failure to treat 400 syphilis infected males).
31. The Nuremburg code explained the importance of informed consent as follows:
I. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give con-
sent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, with-
out the intervention of any elefihent of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reach-
ing, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient
knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as
to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter
element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the
experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration,
and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be
conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the
effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participa-
tion in the experiment.
Nuremberg Case, reprinted in J. AREEN, LAW, SCIENCE, AND MEDICINE, supra note 29,
at 925.
periment. ' '3 2 In addition, the Nuremburg Code required that infor-
mation as to the exact methods used to conduct the experiment be
disclosed to the human subject. 33
The first federal regulations governing research using human sub-
jects34 required that the informed consent of each human subject be
obtained and documented.35 The scope of disclosure required by
these federal regulations includes the purpose, duration, procedures
used, risks, any discomfort and benefits to the research subject or
any benefits to others.36 A complete description of any benefits to
others that might "reasonably be expected from the research ''a3 ap-
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare published its first rules
governing the protection of human subjects in the 1974 Federal Register, 39 Fed. Reg.
18,914 (1974) (later codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.122 (1985)).
35. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (a)(4)-(5) (1988).
36. The Department of Health and Human Services, the successor to the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare, requires informed consent to contain eight basic
elements as follows:
(1) A statement that the study involves research, an explanation of the pur-
poses of the research and the expected duration of the subject's participation, a
description of the procedures to be followed, and identification of any proce-
dures which are experimental; (2) A description of any reasonably foreseeable
risks or discomforts to the subject; (3) A description of any benefits to the
subject or to others which may reasonably be expected from the research; (4)
A disclosure of appropriate alternative procedures or courses of treatment, if
any, that might be advantageous to the subject; (5) A statement describing the
extent, if any, to which confidentiality of the records identifying the subject
will be maintained; (6) for research involving more than minimal risk, an ex-
planation as to whether any compensation and an explanation as to whether
any medical treatments are available if injury occurs and, if so, what they con-
sist of, or where further information may be obtained; (7) An explanation of
whom to contact for answers to pertinent questions about the research and re-
search subjects' rights, and whom to contact in the event of a research-related
injury to the subject; and (8) a statement that participation is voluntary, re-
fusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which the sub-
ject is otherwise entitled, and the subject may discontinue participation at any
time without penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise
entitled.
45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1)-(8) (1988)(emphasis added).
The HHS regulations provide for six additional elements of informed consent
and include: (1) A statement that the particular treatment or procedure may
involve risks to the subject (or to the embryo or fetus, if the subject is or may
become pregnant) which are currently unforeseeable; (2) Anticipated circum-
stances under which the subject's participation may be terminated by the inves-
tigator without regard to the subject's consent; (3) Any additional costs to the
subject that may result from participation in the research; (4) The conse-
quences of a subject's decision to withdraw from the research and procedures
for orderly termination of participation by the subject; (5) A statement that
significant new findings developed during the course of the research which may
relate to the subject's willingness to continue participation will be provided to
the subject; and (6) The approximate number of subjects involved in the study.
45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(1)-(6) (1988).
37. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(3) (1988). For a discussion of the financial disclosure
required by federal employees, see infra note 52 and the accompanying text.
460
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pears to cover a physician's financial gains. Under this particular
language, the financial gains would have to be disclosed if they were
reasonably expected.38 Thus, extremely speculative financial gains or
very indirect financial gains would not have to be disclosed.39
In California, the Protection of Human Subjects in Medical Ex-
perimentation Act governs human research that is exempt from the
federal regulations.4 0 This Act requires a scope of disclosure to the
research subject, similar to that which is required under the federal
regulations. 41 However, the California Act does not specifically men-
38. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(3) (1988).
39. For financial gains to be reasonably expected, it would appear that the chances
of gain occurring must be reasonably certain. Speculation is defined as hope. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1255 (5th ed. 1979).
40. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24170-24179.5 (West 1984).
41. The Protection of Human Subjects in Medical Experimentation Act requires
that a research subject:
(a) Be informed of the nature and purpose of the experiment.
(b) Be given an explanation of the procedures to be followed in the medical
experiment, and any drug or device to be utilized.
(c) Be given a description of any attendant discomforts and risks reasonably to
be expected from the experiment.
(d) Be given an explanation of any benefits to the subject reasonably to be
expected from the experiment, if applicable.
(e) Be given a disclosure of any appropriate alternative procedures, drugs or
devices that might be advantageous to the subject, and their relative risks and
benefits.
(f) Be informed of the avenues of medical treatment, if any, available to the
subject after the experiment if complications should arise.
(g) Be given an opportunity to ask any questions concerning the experiment or
the procedures involved.
(h) Be instructed that consent to participate in the medical experiment may be
withdrawn at any time and the subject may discontinue participation in the
medical experiment without prejudice.
Id. at § 24172(a)-(h).
Additional requirements include:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no person shall be subjected to
any medical experiment unless the informed consent of such person is obtained.
(b) If a person is under a conservatorship of the person or of the person and
estate, pursuant to Division 4 (commencing with Section 1400) of the Probate
Code, informed consent for a medical experiment involving such person shall
be obtained:
(1) As provided in Section 2354 of the Probate Code if the person has not been
adjudicated to lack the capacity to give informed consent for medical
treatment.
(2) As provided in Section 2355 of the Probate Code if the person has been
adjudicated to lack the capacity to give informed consent for medical
treatment.
(c) If an adult person is gravely disabled, as defined in subdivision (h) of Sec-
tion 5008 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, and is under a conservatorship
of the person or of the person and estate, pursuant to Chapter 3 (commencing
with Section 5350) of Part 1 of Division 5 of the Welfare and Institutions
tion disclosure of benefits to persons other than the research subject.
A. The Conflicts of the Physician-Researcher
Several professional codes and governmental regulations require
that physicians act only for the good of their patients.42 This require-
ment is one of several reasons that physicians have been held to have
a fiduciary relationship with their patients. 43 Typically, a fiduciary
(the physician) is required to act in good faith and with due regard
for the interests of the beneficiary (the patient) who is dependent on
and trusts the fiduciary." In fulfilling this duty of good faith, the
Code, informed consent for a medical experiment involving such person shall
be obtained from such person, unless the conservator of such person has the
right to consent to medical treatment on behalf of the conservatee, pursuant to
subdivisions (c) and (d) of Section 5357 and Section 5358 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
(d) If an adult person is developmentally disabled, as defined in subdivision (a)
of Section 4512 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, and has no conservator
and is mentally incapable of giving informed consent, informed consent shall be
obtained for a medical experiment involving such person, pursuant to subdivi-
sion (c) of Section 4655 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(e) Informed consent given by a person other than the human subject pursuant
to subdivisions (b) through (d), inclusive, of this section shall only be for medi-
cal experiments related to maintaining or improving the health of the human
subject or related to obtaining information about a pathological condition of
the human subject.
Id. § 24175.
42. See, e.g., the ancient Hippocratic oath states, "I will apply dietetic measures
for the benefit of the sick according to my ability and judgement; I will keep them from
harm and injustice ... Whatever houses I may visit, I will come for the benefit of the
sick, remaining free of all intentional injustice .... ." The Hippocratic Oath reprinted in
J. AREEN, LAW, SCIENCE & MEDICINE, supra note 29, at 273.
The preamble to the American Medical Association, Principles of Medical Ethics
states, "The medical profession has long subscribed to a body of ethical statements devel-
oped primarily for the benefit of the patient." American Medical Association, Principles
of Medical Ethics, reprinted in J. AREEN, LAW. SCIENCE AND MEDICINE, supra note 29,
at 275.
The Declaration of Helsinki made by the 18th World Medical Assembly in 1964 and
subsequently revised in 1975 and 1983 provides:
The Declaration of Geneva of the World Medical Association binds the physi-
cian with the words, "The health of my patient will be my first consideration,"
and the International Code of Medical Ethics declares that a physician shall
act only in the patient's interest when providing medical care which might have
the effect of weakening the physical and mental condition of the patient.
The Declaration of Helsinki, reprinted in, J. AREEN, LAW, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE,
supra note 29, at 927.
43. A. HOLDER. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 282-86 (2d ed. 1978). See also
Holder, Do Researchers and Subjects Have a Fiduciary Relationship?, 4 IRB, A RE-
VIEW OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH 6 (Jan. 1982).
44. Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan, 53 D.L.R. 2d 436, 52 W.W.R. 608
(Sask. Ct. App. 1965), reprinted in J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS
569 (1972) (court recognized a physician-researcher owed a fiduciary duty to the re-
search subject); Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 804, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67, 77
(1969) ("The relationship between a physician and his patient is fiduciary, which like all
such relationships, imposes a duty of full disclosure"). J. SHEPARD, THE LAW oF FIDUCi-
462
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fiduciary is required to give the beneficiary full disclosure of any ad-
verse interest.45
The goals of a researcher are naturally different from those of a
physician. The researcher wants to produce new knowledge that will
either benefit the current research subject or future patients. 46 This
is different than a physician who is only concerned with treating that
particular patient. In addition, the researcher may be motivated by
the desire for recognition, promotion, or to obtain funding.4 Given
these additional conflicts inherent to the researcher, the doctrine of
informed consent requires a more rigorous disclosure in the research
setting. For example, the federal regulations require the disclosure of
"the benefits the subject or others may receive from the research"48
and whether financial compensation for research or treatment is
available.4"
The physician and the researcher may be consciously or uncon-
sciously motivated by the desire for financial gain. The physician is
required by California law to disclose direct and indirect interests in
entities that provide medical services and products. 0 This require-
ment helps assure that the patient's consent to the particular medical
procedure is truly informed.51 The researcher is also required by gov-
ernmental regulations to make a disclosure of various direct and in-
ARIES, 96 (1981). See also Frankel, Fiduciary Law 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 824 at note 99
(1983).
45. Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N.Y. 439, 440, 154 N.E. 303, 304 (1926) (Justice Car-
dozo described the disclosure requirements of a fiduciary duty, "[d]isclosure so indefinite
and equivocal does not set the agent free to bargain for his own account .... If dual
interests are to be served, the disclosure to be effective must lay bare the truth, without
ambiguity or reservation, in all its stark significance."); Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App.
3d 790, 804, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67, 77 (1969) (requiring full disclosure); Stafford v. Shultz,
42 Cal. 2d 767, 773, 270 P.2d 1, 7 (1954) (requiring full and complete disclosure).
46. See Merton, Priorities in Scientific Discovery, 22 AM. Soc. REV. 635 (1957).
See generally, Karp v. Cooley 493 F. 2d 408 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974)
(describing the development of the artificial heart).
47. For a study on the motivations of a physician-researcher, see B. BARBER, J.
LALLY, J. MAKARUSKA, AND D. SULLIVAN, RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS: PROBLEMS
OF SOCIAL CONTROL IN MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION (1973); See also Burton v. Brook-
lyn Doctors Hosp., 88 A.D.2d 217, 452 N.Y.S.2d 875 (1982).
48. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(3) (1990).
49. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(6) (1990).
50. See supra notes 21-25 and the accompanying text.
51. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 654.1 (West 1986) (requiring written disclosure of
certain interests), true informed consent requires the disclosure of any information a pa-
tient would consider material to his or her decision of whether to undergo the proposed
medical procedure. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
direct economic interests.52
III. EXPOSITION OF THE CASE
A. The Facts
The requirement that a physician researcher disclose to the patient
any research interests in, and possible future financial benefits flow-
ing from a patient's tissue, was recently set forth by the California
Supreme court in Moore v. The Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia.53 In 1974 John Moore, the plaintiff, started experiencing va-
rious s ,mptoms of his illness, including fevers, abdominal pains and
increased incidences of bruising.54 These symptoms continued until
1976 when he was diagnosed as having hairy-cell leukemia. 55 His,
physician referred him to the University of California, Los Angeles
Medical Center (UCLA) for treatment of the hairy-cell leukemia.""
Mr. Moore's primary physician at UCLA was Dr. David Golde, who
confirmed the diagnosis of hairy-cell leukemia. Both Dr. Golde and
Shirley Quan, a researcher that collaborated with Dr. Golde, were
employed by the Regents of the University of California, which owns
and operates UCLA.
Dr. Golde hospitalized Mr. Moore and ordered that blood, bone
marrow57 and other bodily substances be withdrawn in order to con-
firm that Mr. Moore did indeed have hairy-cell leukemia.r8 Because
Mr. Moore had massive splenomegaly when he was first examined at
UCLA, Dr. Golde recommended that his spleen be removed "to slow
down the progress of the disease."59
Dr. Golde and Ms. Quan had made arrangements "to obtain por-
tions of [Mr. Moore's] spleen following its removal." 60 Dr. Golde
gave written instructions on October eighteenth and nineteenth of
1976 indicating that the spleen portions removed from Mr. Moore
52. A significant number of researchers are federal employees or receive federal
support and thus are required to disclose "the interest, if any, of a spouse, minor child, or
other member of your immediate household." Executive Order No. 11222, § 403, of May
8, 1965, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1964-1965), 30 Fed. Reg. 6469. See also Kurt, FDA Issues
Concerning Conflicts of Interest, 12 IRB. A REVIEW OF HUMAN SUBJECTs RESERCH 6
(1990); CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 24173(c)(9) (West 1982) (requiring disclo-
sure of the funding source of the research).
53. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 271 Cal.
Rptr. 146, 793 P.2d 479 (1990). This description of the facts is derived from the Su-
preme Court's opinion, which is based on the plaintiff's third amended complaint that
was on review before the Supreme Court because of a demurrer by the defendants.
54. Golde and Quan, U.S. Patent No. 4,438,032, at col. 6, !. 65 (1984).
55. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 125, 793 P.2d at 401, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id., 51 Cal. 3d at 126, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148, 793 P.2d at 481.
59. Id. Splenomegaly is the englargement of the spleen.
60. Id.
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should be taken to a separate research unit.61 Neither Golde nor
Quan informed Mr. Moore of this research plan; and they did not
obtain his permission to do S0.62
During the next several years, Dr. Golde directed Mr. Moore to
return to the UCLA Medical Center so that additional samples of
blood, serum, skin, bone marrow and sperm could be obtained. 3 Dr.
Golde indicated that these samples were required for Mr. Moore's
"health and well-being, and based upon the trust inherent in and by
virtue of the physician-patient relationship."6 In addition, Dr. Golde
asked Mr. Moore to travel from his home in Seattle to the UCLA
Medical Center, because Dr. Golde wanted the procedures per-
formed only at the UCLA Medical Center under his personal
direction.65
Golde and Quan produced the Mo cell line from Mr. Moore's
spleen cells sometime before August of 1979.6 The Mo cell line con-
stitutively produces a number of lymphokines6 7 including colony-
stimulating factor,68 erythroid-potentiating activity, 9 Type II im-
mune interferon,70 neutrophil migration-inhibition factor, 1 T-cell
growth factor,7 2 macrophage activating factor 7  and fibroblast
61. Id.
62. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 126, 793 P.2d at 481, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting Moore's third amended complaint).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 127, 793 P.2d at 481, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148. When cells are first re-
moved from the body, they will not grow indefinitely in vitro and are called primary
cells. Primary cells can be adapted to grow in vitro using various techniques to produce a
cell line. See generally, U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DE-
VELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS, 31-46
(1987) [hereinafter OTA REPORT].
67. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 127 n.2, 793 P.2d at 481 n.2, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148 n.2.
Lymphokines are proteins that regulate the immune system. See generally OTA RE-
PORT, supra note 66.
68. Colony stimulating factor is a protein that causes granulocyte-macrophage
progenitors to proliferate in vitro. See Golde and Quan, US. Patent No. 4,438,032, col.
4, 1.20 (1984).
69. Erythroid-potentiating activity is a protein that causes human erythroid
progenitors to proliferate in vitro. See Golde and Quan, U.S. Patent No. 4,438,032, col.
3, 1.46 (1984).
70. Immune interferon is a protein that enhances natural killer cell activity and
thus has anti-tumor activity. See D. STITES, J. STOBO, H. FUDENBERG & J. WELLS, BASIC
& CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY, 720 (4th ed. 1982) [hereinafter D. STITES].
71. Neutrophil migration-inhibition factor'is a protein that inhibits the migration
of neutrophils. See Golde and Quan, U.S. Patent No. 4,438,032, col. 4, 1.61 (1984).
72. T-cell growth factor (Interleukin-2 or IL-2) is a protein that promotes the
growth of T lymphocytes. See D. STITES, supra note 66, at 740.
73. Macrophage activation factor is a protein that stimulates macrophages so they
465
growth-stimulating factor.74 The Regent of the University of Califor-
nia applied for a patent on the Mo cell line on January 30, 1981,
naming Dr. Golde and Ms. Quan as joint inventors.75
Dr. Golde negotiated agreements with Genetics Institute to com-
mercialize the Mo cell line and any products derived from that cell
line.7'6 Under these agreements, Dr. Golde became a paid consultant
and acquired a significant amount of Genetics Institute's common
stock." The agreements also provided that Genetics Institute would
pay Dr. Golde and the Regents $330,000 over three years to obtain
exclusive access to Mr. Moore and research performed on the Mo
cell line and any product derived from that cell line.7 8
Dr. Golde and the Regents of the University of California made a
second agreement with Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation
whereby Sandoz was added to the Genetics Institute agreement and
Dr. Golde and the Regents received $110,000 in additional compen-
sation.7 9 It appears that at least a portion of the compensation was
given directly or indirectly to Dr. Golde.80
Dr. Golde, Shirley Quan, and the Regents of the University of
California, together with Genetics Institute, Inc. and Sandoz Phar-
maceutical Corporation, were named as defendants in the original
complaint. 81
B. The Trial Court Decision
Mr. Moore plead thirteen causes of action, including conversion
and lack of informed consent. 82 The defendants demurred to each
alleged cause of action. The Superior Court only considered the va-
lidity of the conversion cause of action because the allegations for
conversion formed the foundation for the other causes of action.83
The trial court then sustained Genetics Institute's and Sandoz's de-
become phagocytic cells. See D. STITES, supra note 70, at 741.
74. Fibroblast growth stimulating factor is a protein that stimulates the growth of
fibroblast cell. See Moscatelli, U.S. Patent No. 4,994,559 (1991).
75. Golde and Quan, U.S. Patent No. 4,438,032 (1984). US. Patent No. 4,438,032
was filed on January 6, 1983 and claimed priority of a prior application filed by Golde,
Quan and the Regents of the Univ. of California on January 30, 1981.
76. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 127, 793 P.2d at 482, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 128, 793 P.2d at 482, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
80. Id. at 127, 793 P.2d at 483, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
81. Id. at 125, 793 P.2d at 480-81, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 147-48.
82. Id. at 128 n.4, 793 P.2d at 482 n.4, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149 n.4. The 11 addi-
tional causes of action were (1) breach of fiduciary duty (2) fraud and deceit; (3) unjust
enrichment; (4) quasi-contract; (5) bad faith breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing; (6) intentional infliction at emotional distress; (7) negligent mis-
representation; (8) intentional interference with prospective advantageous economic rela-
tionships; (9) slander of title; (10) accounting; and (11) declaratory relief.
83. Id. at 128, 793 P.2d at 482, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
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murrers without leave to amend and took the remaining demurrers
off the calendar. 4
The court sustained the Regents', Golde's and Quan's joint de-
murrer to the conversion cause of action. In addition, because the
same allegations were the foundation of the other causes of action,
the court also sustained the demurrers to the additional actions.
C. The Court of Appeal Decision
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that a cause of action for
conversion was stated . 5 The Court of Appeal dismissed all the alle-
gations against Genetics Institute and Sandoz with leave to amend.88
In addition, the Court of Appeal instructed the trial court to decide
the remaining causes of action on which it had declined to rule.
7
D. The Decision of the Supreme Court
The Court of Appeal decision was affirmed in part and reversed in
part by the California Supreme Court.8 The Supreme Court or-
dered the trial court to overrule Dr. Golde's demurrers to the breach
of fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent causes of action.8 9
The Supreme Court sustained the demurrers with leave to amend by
the Regents, Quan, Genetics Institute and Sandoz to the breach of
fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent.90
The court held that a physician trying to obtain a patient's consent
for a medical procedure has a fiduciary duty to disclose facts mate-
rial to the patient's consent.91 To fulfill that fiduciary duty and to
obtain informed consent, the physician must disclose personal inter-
ests unrelated to the patient's health, including research and eco-
nomic interests that could affect the physician's medical judgment. 2
84. Id.
85. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 249
Cal. Rptr. 494, rev. granted, 252 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1988).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d
479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990).
89. Id.
90. The Supreme Court reasoned that because these defendants were not physi-
cians, they did not have a fiduciary duty to Mr. Moore and could only be liable through
Dr. Golde. Id. at 133, 793 P.2d at 486, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 153. The court also sustained
all of the defendants' demurrer without leave to amend the cause of action for conver-
sion. Id. at 120, 793 P.2d at 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
91. Id. at 129, 793 P.2d at 483, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
92. Id.
The court noted that Mr. Moore's cause of action could be "charac-
terized either as the breach of a fiduciary duty to disclose facts ma-
terial to the patient's consent or, alternatively, as the performance of
medical procedures without first having obtained the patient's in-
formed consent. 93
The court's analysis rested on three principles" of informed consent:
(1) adults have the right to control their bodies and they can deter-
mine whether to submit to a particular medical procedure;9 4 (2) the
patient must give informed consent to the medical procedure; and
(3) the physician has a fiduciary duty to disclose all information that
is "material to the patient's decision" of whether to consent to a par-
ticular medical procedure. 95 Based on these principles, the court con-
cluded: (1) a physician must disclose personal research or economic
interest that may affect the professional judgment of the physician;
and (2) the failure to disclose these unrelated personal interests
"may give rise to a cause of action for performing medical proce-
dures without informed consent or breach of fiduciary duty."961
The court then went on to explore the scope of the disclosure re-
quired to obtain a patient's informed consent. It concluded that the
scope of disclosure required to obtain informed consent is broad
enough to include non-medical personal interests of the physician.97
The court also pointed out that the case law and legislation already
recognize that some of a physician's economic interests could affect
the professional judgement of that physician.98
The court also considered the potential conflict of a physician-re-
searcher who conducts research in the same scientific area that the
physician practices in.99 Because the physician's research interests
potentially affect the physician's medical judgment, the court con-
cluded that a "reasonable patient would want to know" of the re-
search interest when "deciding whether to consent to a proposed
course of treatment."100
The court then applied these conclusions to the allegations made
in Mr. Moore's third amended complaint against Dr. Golde.10' It
concluded that Dr. Golde had an undisclosed research interest in
Mr. Moore's spleen cells when he obtained Mr. Moore's consent for






98. Id. at 129, 793 P.2d at 483-84, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150-51.
99. Id. at 130, 793 P.2d at 484, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 132, 793 P.2d at 485, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
102. Id.
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disclosing this research interest, in violation of informed consent
principles.
In addition, the court concluded that Dr. Golde had a financial
interest in Mr. Moore's cells when the patent application was pre-
pared in May of 1979.103 Thus, the blood and body fluids extracted
from Mr. Moore after May of 1979 were taken by Dr. Golde with-
out the required disclosure of Dr. Golde's financial interest. This also
violated informed consent principles.104
1. The Scope of Disclosure Required After Moore v.
The Regents of the University of California
The Supreme Court's unanimous ruling stated that "a physician
who is seeking a patient's consent for a medical procedure must, in
order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient's in-
formed consent, disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient's
health, whether research or economic, that may affect his medical
judgment." 105 The court specifically states that the physician's fidu-
ciary duty is not so broad as to make the physician the patient's
financial advisor, but rather only requires disclosure of personal in-
terests that "may affect professional judgment."'10
2. The Scope of Financial Disclosure Required
Under sections 654.1 and 654.2 of the California Business and
Professions Code, physicians cannot receive any unearned monetary
compensation for referring a patient to an entity in which they have
a proprietary or co-ownership interest. 10 7 The types of interests that
must be disclosed to the patients under this statute include "any fi-
nancial interest that is greater than $5,000." 10o The form of that
financial interest appears to include co-ownership, partnerships, lim-
ited partnerships, and licensees, but does not include stockholders of
103. Id.
104. Id. at 132, 793 P.2d at 485-86, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 152-53.
105. Id. at 131-32, 793 P.2d at 485, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
106. Id. at 131 n.10, 793 P.2d at 485 n.10, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 152 n. 10 (emphasis
added).
107. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 654.1-.2 (West 1990) (These statutes are in-
tended to protect patients from a physician's conflict of interest as stated in Moore, 51
Cal. 3d at 129, 793 P.2d at 483, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
108. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 654.2(d)(2) (West 1990) states, "'significant
beneficial interest' means any financial interest that is equal to or greater than the lesser
of the following: (A) Five percent of the whole. (B) Five thousand dollars ($5,000)."
a corporation. 09
Dr. Golde had at least three distinct financial interests in Mr.
Moore's cells: (1) the contracts with Genetics Institute and Sandoz
which provided exclusive access to Mr. Moore's cells; (2) the Genet-
ics Institute stock; and (3) Dr. Golde's consultant status with Genet-
ics Institute.110 Dr. Golde's stock in Genetics Institute would proba-
bly not need to be disclosed to a patient because stockholders of a
corporation are not a financial interest covered by section 654.1 of
the California Business and Professions Code.' However, other
California statutes governing a physician's interest in a medical pro-
vider to which the physician refers patients, have been interpreted to
require the disclosure of simple stock ownership worth over
$25,000.1"2 This latter view of simple stock ownership appears to be
109. Magan Medical Clinic v. Cal. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 249 Cal.
App. 2d 124, 136, 57 Cal. Rptr. 256, 265 (1967) (holding "proprietary interest" or
"ownership in any form" does not include holding stock in a corporation). But see 68
Ops. Cal. Attorney Gen. 140 (1985) (stating that a "significant beneficial interest" in-
cludes stock ownership).
110. See supra notes 76-78 and the accompanying text.
111. See Magan Medical Clinic, 249 Cal. App. 2d at 136, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 265;
But see 68 Ops. Cal. Attorney Gen. at 140 (1985).
112. The Med-Cal requirements for avoiding conflicts of interests require disclo-
sure of a significant financial interest defined as:
(1)'Significant beneficial interest' means any financial interest held by a pro-
vider, or a member of the provider's immediate family, in another provider that
is equal to or greater than the lesser of the following:
(A)Five per cent of the whole.
(B)$25,000.00
(2)'Immediate family' means spouse, son, daughter, father, mother, father-in-
law, mother-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law.
(d)Interests held by a provider and members of that provider's immediate fam-
ily shall be combined and valued as a single interest.
(1) The extent of financial interest shall be determined as follows:
(A)Full ownership shall be considered as 100 percent financial interest and
control regardless of mortgages or other incumbrances.
(B)Interest in a partnership shall be determined on the basis of the percent-
age of ownership specified in either a written or verbal partnership agreement.
(C)Interest in a corporation shall be determined by computing the percent-
age of stock or bonds owned of the total outstanding shares or bonds of the
corporation as of the last working day of the month preceding compliance with
(a).
(D)AI1 other financial arrangements shall require establishment of a fair and
reasonable dollar value for both the interest and the whole. The percentage
interest shall be computed as the percentage the dollar value of the interest
represents of the whole.
(2) The dollar value of the following types of interests shall be determined as
follows:
(A)Bonds, over-the-counter stocks and stocks listed on the major stock ex-
changes shall be valued at the closing selling price on the last working day of
the month preceding compliance with (a).
(B)Stocks in a closely held corporation shall be valued at the original
purchase price, par value, or current market value, whichever is greater.
(C)Partnership interests shall be valued at the total dollar amount invested
in organizing the partnership. A fair and reasonable dollar equivalent shall be
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better able to fulfill the legislature's intent of preventing conflicts of
interest.
However, the contracts and Dr. Golde's consultant status are a
different type of interest. The contract was for more than $25,000
and is the type of interest, that if it is in a medical clinic or other
entity, must be disclosed pursuant to the California statutes.113 In
addition, the fact that the contract directly affected Mr. Moore
makes it material to Moore's decision. 114
The exact terms of Dr. Golde's consulting agreements are not
known, but at least one appears to be directly related to the contract
with Genetics Institute." 5 That agreement appears to directly in-
volve the commercialization of Mr. Moore's cells and was thus mate-
rial to Mr. Moore's decisionmaking process." 6 Therefore, the court
would probably require the disclosure of any significant financial in-
terest directly related to Mr. Moore or his cells regardless of the
exact form of that interest.
3. The Scope of Research Disclosure Required
Under federal and California statutes, the scope of disclosure re-
quired to obtain informed consent is extremely broad."" As "stated,
these regulations require the disclosure of potential benefits of the
research to the patient and others, and the nature, purpose and pro-
cedures to be followed during the experiment." 8
Dr. Golde had arranged to obtain portions of Mr. Moore's spleen
after it was removed and to obtain samples of Mr. Moore's body
fluids and cells, years after the initial splenectomy. Dr. Golde made
these arrangements without ever telling Mr. Moore of his research
interests."19 Dr. Golde was required under current regulation to
make such a disclosure, but none was given. 2 °
determined if investment is not in form of monies.
(D) All other financial arrangements shall be valued at the actual dollar
investment or a fair and reasonable dollar equivalent for investments not in the
form of monies."
CAL. ADMIN. CODE TIT. 22 § 51466 (1991).
113. See supra notes 2, 3, 108 and the accompanying text.
114. See supra note 17 and the accompanying text.
115. See supra note 78 and the accompanying text.
116. Id.
117. See supra notes 34-41 and the accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 34-41.
119. See supra notes 63-64 and the accompanying text.,
120. Informed consent of experimental procedures is required under the current
Health and Human Services regulation. See supra note 36. In addition, the California
Given the extremely rigorous disclosure requirements in the re-
search setting, Dr. Golde failed'to disclose either a benefit of the
research1 21 or that he was even involved in an experiment. 122 Disclo-
sure of this research's benefit to Dr. Golde was clearly required
under both federal and state regulations.123 Informing Mr. Moore
that he was involved in a research experiment is required under the
regulations124 and professional codes.1 25 Either of the non-disclosed
research interests could have affected Dr. Golde's professional judg-
ment and thus under Moore must be disclosed.
Here, the benefits that could potentially affect Dr. Golde's profes-
sional judgment included a lucrative consulting contract and stock
ownership. These benefits were a direct result of the research per-
formed on Mr. Moore or his cells, and thus, directly affected him.126
Without such a direct cause and effect relationship, the "benefits" to
Dr. Golde would have been very speculative. 127 Speculative benefits
appear to be so uncertain that a professional's judgment probably
would not be altered. Benefits that do not potentially affect profes-
sional judgment should not cause a conflict of interest, and thus do
not have to be disclosed.
The scope of disclosure required under Moore seems to include all
financial or research interests that are not speculative. Thus, con-
crete contracts, consulting agreements and stock ownership directly
related to a patient, and thus certainly affecting a patient, must be
disclosed. However, disclosure of interests that are not very likely to
be benefitted by the particular research would not be required.
IV. THE MOORE CASE ON REMAND
On remand, the superior court will probably conclude that direct
financial interests and indirect financial interests, such as stock own-
ership, must be disclosed. The court will likely scrutinize the terms
of Dr. Golde's various contracts and consulting agreements to deter-
mine whether they directly affect Mr. Moore. In addition, the court
will look at Dr. Golde's other interests, such as research grants, to
determine whether they are likely to benefit from the research on
Mr. Moore or his cells. If these other interests would significantly
Protection of Human Subjects in Medical Experimentation Act also requires informed
consent. See supra notes 37-38 and the accompanying text.
121. Disclosure of the benefits of the research is required under the Health and
Human Services regulations. See supra note 36.
122. Disclosure that an experiment is being carried out is also required. See supra
note 36.
123. See supra notes 36-41.
124. See id. and the accompanying text.
125. See supra note 42 and the accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 66-75 and the accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 105-06 and the accompanying text.
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benefit from the research, Dr. Golde's failure to disclose them will
result in additional damages or charges.
V. RECENT FEDERAL STATUTES AND REGULATIONS RECOGNIZE A
PHYSICIAN'S FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The Department of Health and Human Services recently issued
regulations that clearly recognize that a physician's financial interest
in diagnostic and treatment facilities is a potential conflict of inter-
est.128 The newly issued regulations are intended to eliminate the
physician's conflict of interest when physicians refer patients to
treatment or diagnostic facilities in which they have a significant fi-
nancial interest.129 According to the government, this type of finan-
cial conflict of interest encourages expensive medical procedures to
be overused.130
The new regulations were issued pursuant to section fourteen of
the Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of
1987.131 This section required the development of regulations that
clearly specified which Medicare payment practices would be pro-
tected from criminal prosecution or civil sanctions under the stat-
132
ute's anti-kickback provisions. These regulations were required be-
cause section 1128B(b) of the Social Security Act providing criminal
penalties for receiving remuneration for inducing business reim-
bursed under the Medicare or State Health Care programs is ex-
tremely broad.1 33 The regulations specify ten different safe harbors
128. Medicare and State Health Care Program's Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-
kickback Provisions, § 56 Fed. Reg. 35, 952 (1991) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
1001.951-52).
129. U.S. Limits Doctors in Their Referrals, N.Y. Times, Jul. 26, 1991, at Al,
col. 5.
130. Id.
131. Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-93, § 14, 101 Stat. 680, 697 (1987).
Section 2 of this act gave the Office of the Inspector General the authority to exclude
an individual or an entity from reimbursement under Medicare or State Health Care
programs if the party had participated in an illegal remuneration scheme. Id. at § 2.
132. Id.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1991). This statute states in its pertinent part:
(b) Illegal remunerations. (1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or re-
ceives any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or
indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind -
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or
arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be
made in whole or in part under title XVIII [42 USCS § 1395 et seq.] or a
State health care program, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or recom-
under which a person or an entity can be assured that they will not
be subject to either criminal or civil actions.134
The regulations state that an entity may be excluded from receiv-
ing Medicare or State Health Care program reimbursement if more
than forty percent of the entity is owned by physicians or other busi-
nesses that are in a position to refer patients to that entity. 135 In
addition to the ownership limitation, the regulations also state that
no more than forty percent of the gross revenues may come from
patients referred to the entity by physicians or other businesses that
own more than forty percent of the entity."3 ' The regulations do not
make distinctions between the type of ownership or investment inter-
est held by the physician in a position to refer patients to the entity
and therefore consider active and passive investments consisting of
partnership interest, limited partnership interests and stock owner-
ship in a corporation to count towards the forty percent ownershiplimit.1 37
The issuance of these regulations confirms the federal govern-
ment's recognition of a potential financial conflict of interest when
physicians own an interest in a diagnostic or treatment facility that
they can, and do refer patients to.138 Because the federal government
has clearly recognized these financial conflicts of interest, a court in
a state that does not have statutes, regulations or cases that clearly
recognize financial conflicts of interest is more likely to look to the
mending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for
which payment may be made in whole or in part under title XVIII [42 USCS§ 1395 et seq.] or a State health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not
more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (in-
cluding any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or co-
vertly, in cash or in kind to any person to induce such person-
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the
furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole or
in part under title XVIII [42 USCS § 1395 et seq.], a State health care pro-
gram, or
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing, leas-
ing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment may be
made in whole or in part under title XVIII [42 USCS § 1395 et seq.] or a state
health care program, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof,
shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five
years, or both.
Id.
134. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,984-87 (1991) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
1001.952).
135. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,984 (1991) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
1001.952(a) (2) (vi)).
136. Id.
137. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,985 (1991) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
1001.952(9)).
138. The federal government recognized this potential financial conflict of interest
when it passed the legislation at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b), supra note 6.
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federal statutes and regulations when presented with a lawsuit simi-
lar to the Moore case. Although only persuasive, the federal statutes
and regulations, in addition to the Moore case itself, are likely to
cause other state courts to expand the scope of informed consent to
include these financial conflicts of interest.
VI. CONCLUSION
After the California Supreme Court's decision in Moore v. The
Regents of the University of California, any research or economic
interest physicians have that might affect their medical judgment of
the physician must be disclosed. Economic interests such as stock
ownership in a directly involved company, consulting contracts and
contracts for access to a patient must be disclosed. Disclosure of fi-
nancial information that does not directly involve the patient, the
patient's treatment or the patient's body or body parts is not re-
quired. Such information would simply not be material to the pa-
tient's informed consent. In addition, because of the recently-issued
Department of Health and Human Services regulations that clearly'
recognize financial conflicts of interests, other jurisdictions are likely
to expand the scope of informed consent to include disclosure of
these conflicts.
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